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Post-Communist Romania
A Peculiar Case of Divided Government
CRISTINA MANOLACHE
If for the most part of its post-communist history, Romania experienced a form 
of unified government based on political coalitions and alliances which resulted in 
conflictual relations between the executive and the legislative and even among the 
dualist executive itself, it should come as no surprise that the periods of divided 
government are marked by strong confrontations which have culminated with two 
failed suspension attempts.
The main form of divided government in Romania is that of cohabitation, 
and it has been experienced only twice, for a brief period of time: in 2007-2008 
under Prime-Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu of the National Liberal Party 
and again, starting May 2012, under Prime Minister Victor Ponta of the Social 
Democratic Party. It is important to note that, on both occasions, the President in 
office has been Traian Băsescu of the Democratic Liberal Party, and that none of 
these cohabitations are the result of any type of elections. Even though these two 
periods of cohabitation are quite similar, the consequences they determined are 
far more dramatic than those experienced by any other European country with a 
semi-presidential regime.
This study is dedicated to a theoretical and empirical examination of divided 
government, as it has manifested itself on the Romanian political arena. Employed to 
characterize several central governments in the history of post-World War II United 
States of America, the concept of divided government has managed to expand to 
such an extent that it is now widely used in scrutinizing semi-presidential regimes 
throughout Europe, proving that it is not specific to presidential regimes. Throughout 
the first part of my paper, I will present an extensive theoretical explanation of what 
”divided government” and ”cohabitation” mean, focusing on a significant correlation 
between cohabitation and semi-presidentialism, which is the source of the peculiarity 
of Romanian government. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the Romanian case represents the central section 
of my paper, in which I embark on an empirical assessment of the degree and the 
respective manner in which divided government has occurred in our country. I find 
that the theoretical models and explanations on the emergence of divided government 
in semi-presidential regimes are not applicable to the Romanian case, thus rendering 
it as an exception, by contrast with other cases throughout Europe.
Finally, the last part is dedicated to an explanation of the consequences divided 
government is most likely to produce and I contend that the Romanian post-communist 
instances provide for the most dramatic such effects of divided government. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The literature on divided government has emerged in the late 1980s and is mainly 
represented by the seminal works of scholars such as Morris Fiorina, Gary Cox, 
Kernell Samuel and Gary Jacobson in which they analyze the concept of ”divided 
government” as it is illustrated by the American example, some focusing on revealing 
the conditions which lead to the emergence of this phenomenon, while others are 
dedicated to measuring its effects and establishing whether they are positive or 
negative. However, a decade later and after numerous research on the causes and 
consequences of divided government, this concept has expanded its significance and is 
now considered to be applicable not only to presidential regimes, but to parliamentary 
and semi-presidential regimes as well, with all of their respective varieties. In this 
section of my paper, I explore the conceptual delimitations that have been suggested 
throughout time by the scholars on this topic.
The studies on divided government first began with James Sundquist’s article in 
Political Science Quarterly1, in 1988, and the election of George Bush as President against 
a Democratic-dominated Congress, when it became apparent that the phenomenon of 
divided government was a recurrent theme in American politics and even ”a legitimate 
form of party control”2. Contextually put, divided government clearly referred to 
the situation in which the executive represented by the American President was not 
supported by a majority in the Congress — or as Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle 
wrote in 1991 ”the meaning of divided government is straightforward in the U.S.”3 
especially given its consistent experience with it. 
According to Bingham Powell, a possible definition would basically imply that 
”different political parties control different branches of government”4. Similarly, 
Peterson and Greene asserted that divided government meant ”power-sharing by 
two separately elected branches of government, each often controlled by a different 
party”5. The emphasis in these two definitions rests on the divided party control, 
which often a times results in difficulties in implementing any governing program 
and in ambiguity over the accountability for failed policies. 
Another political scientist, James Pfiffner contains that divided government 
refers to that situation in which ”one political party does not control both houses 
of Congress along with the Presidency”6. He further completed his definition by 
emphasizing its specificity to the US-system and by adding that it represents ”the 
1 James L. SUNDQUIST, ”Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Govern-
ment in the United States”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 103, no. 4, 1988, pp. 613-635/p. 619.
2 Mark JONES, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies, University of 
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1995, p. 84.
3 Michael LAVER, Kenneth SHEPSLE, ”Divided Government: America is Not ‘Exceptional’”, 
Governance, vol. 4, no. 3, 1991, pp. 250-269/p. 252.
4 Powell BINGHAM, ”Divided Government as a Pattern of Governance”, Governance, 
vol. 4, no. 3, 1991, pp. 231-235/p. 231.
5 Paul PETERSON, Jay GREENE, ”Why Executive-Legislative Conflict in the United States 
is Dwindling”, British Journal of Political Science, no. 24, 1993, pp. 33-55/p. 33.
6 James PFIFFNER, ”The President and the Post-Reform Congress”, in Roger DAVIDSON 
(ed), The Post-Reform Congress, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994, p. 167.
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control of the presidency by one party, accompanied by the control of one or both 
houses of Congress by another party”1.
On the other hand, unified government is simply and unequivocally defined by 
Paul Quirk to be ”the situation in which the President and majorities of the House and 
Senate belong to the same party”2, which he considered to be an ideal formula in order 
to avoid the gridlock effects of divided government. Four years later, Matthew Shugart 
and John Carey articulated the differences between unified government, divided 
government and no-majority government, stating that ”divided government refers 
only to those situations in which a legislative majority is held by a party or pre-election 
coalition which is different from the President”3, whereas ”no-majority points to a 
situation in which no party holds a majority in one or both houses of the Congress”4. 
This precise differentiation introduced the idea that this concept was not exclusive to 
the presidential system of the United States of America and, quite contrarily, that it 
was applicable to parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes as well. 
On this note, as Laver and Shepsle underlined, these differences ”must derive from 
divided parties, not divided government”5, thus emphasizing that the arithmetical 
context from which divided government emerges is actually predetermined by the 
political context. Hence, it is not only the constitutional architecture that provides 
for a certain type of separation of powers that eventually favours the emergence of 
divided government, but it is mainly the fact that those institutions established by 
the Constitution are not controlled by the same political party or, by extension, by the 
same governing coalition which forms the majority in the legislature. 
In perhaps one of the most useful materials I found on this topic, Robert Elgie 
explains in his Divided Government in a Comparative Perspective that 
”despite these constitutional differences, the arithmetical definition of divided 
government does have its logical equivalent in non presidential regimes. In the 
case of parliamentary regimes, it corresponds to minority governments. In the 
case of semi-presidential regimes, it corresponds to periods of ‘cohabitation’ or 
split-executive government, as well”6.
Last but not least, a quite interesting understanding of divided government 
pertains to the behavioral school of thought and it implies, irregardless of any political 
or arithmetical pre-conditions that ”there is conflict between the executive and 
legislative branches of government, whatever the support for the executive in the 
1 Ibidem, p. 226.
2 Paul QUIRK, ”Domestic Policy: Divided Government and Cooperative Presidential 
Leadership”, in Colin CAMPBELL, Bert ROCKMAN (eds), The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals, 
Chatham House, New Jersey, 1991, pp. 69-91/p. 70.
3 Matthew Soberg SHUGART, John CAREY, ”The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources 
of Divided Presidential Government”, American Political Science Review, vol. 89, no. 2, 1995, 
pp. 327-343/p. 327.
4 Robert ELGIE, Divided Government in Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2001, p. 7.
5 Michael LAVER, Kenneth SHEPSLE, ”Divided Government…cit.”, p. 266.
6 Robert ELGIE, Divided Government…cit.
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legislature”1. Indeed, conflictual situations are quite likely to occur during periods of 
divided government in any given political regime, yet they are generally believed to 
be the consequences of this particular situation in which the executive does not enjoy 
majority support in the legislative. 
Still, conflictual relations may arise even within the same governing coalition or 
even within the same political formation. An example in point is precisely that of the 
Romanian President Ion Iliescu who, during his first mandate, experienced conflictual 
relations with his designated Prime-Minister – Petre Roman (1990-1991), even though 
they were members of the same political party – the National Salvation Front and 
enjoyed the support of a comfortable majority in both houses of the Parliament. 
Another example is that of the Romanian President Emil Constantinescu and his 
Prime-Minister from within the same governing coalition, Radu Vasile (1998-1999), 
both part of the same Democratic Convention and supported by a safe coalition in 
Parliament. The behavioral definition of divided government is definitely applicable 
to their cases.
Although the literature on the behavioral form of divided government is rather 
limited to this point, I believe that the Romanian political context demands an 
analysis that would not limit itself to the arithmetical exploration of the situations 
of divided government – the best examples are those of the cohabitation period of 
President Traian Băsescu and Prime-Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu (2007-2008) 
and the more recent case during the second mandate of President Traian Băsescu and 
Prime-Minister Victor Ponta (May 2012-present) – but one which would also take into 
account the cases in which coalitions formed in order to win the presidential elections 
or the legislative elections result in confrontational relations between the heads of the 
public authorities. 
In fact, in a study published in 1997, Guys Peters argued that the European 
concept of coalition governments is, in fact, ”a form of divided government [...] 
because it entails a need for representatives of the executive to bargain, cajole and 
propose side payments for legislators”2. If the leaders of the political parties which 
form the coalition no longer agree on the direction of their governance, they may 
break the coalition and, even if they remain in their offices as heads of the public 
authorities, they produce gridlocks or even institutional blockages. One of the first 
such examples is that of President Traian Băsescu and Prime-Minister Călin Popescu 
Tăriceanu, who broke the ”Justice and Truth” coalition in 2007, after a period of 
tense relations and subsequently remained in office, but with many cases of juridical 
conflicts of a constitutional nature brought to the Romanian Constitutional Court, 
with a total of six censorship motions which were eventually dismissed in Parliament 
and even with an impeachment attempt (2007) that failed. However, the degree of 
conflict during both the period of unified government under the Truth and Justice 
coalition (2004-2007) and the period of divided government under cohabitation/
split-executive (2007-2008) was very high, denoting little if any difference between 
the behavioral and the arithmetical definition of divided government in our country. 
1 Ibidem, p. 7.
2 Guys PETERS, ”The Separation of Powers in Parliamentary Systems”, in Kurt von 
METTENHEIM (ed), Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and 
National Contexts, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997, pp. 69-70.
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Finally, the same theoretical explanations hold true with regard to umbrella 
political formations, such as the National Salvation Front, which eventually fragmented 
itself into several political parties and the Romanian Democratic Convention, which 
was already fragmented from within between the diverse political parties that formed 
it. In these situations, the potential for conflict and divided government within the 
same political coalition has proven to be, in the Romanian case, quite significant, and 
may only be attributed to the behavioral understanding of divided government. 
Cohabitation as a Form of Divided Government
in Semi-Presidential Regimes
A particular form of divided government is that of cohabitation, a term coined 
and generated by the French experience of the President François Mitterrand in 1986-
1988, of the socialist party, who cohabitated with Prime-Minister Jacques Chirac, of 
the right wing. In fact, it has been argued that cohabitation is ”a country-specific 
manifestation of a more general political phenomenon”1.
In his ”Divided Government in Comparative Perspective” Robert Elgie maintains 
that cohabitation 
”occurs in the context of a system in which both the President and the prime 
minister are significant political actors and is brought about when the President 
is faced with an opposition majority in the National Assembly and thus is obliged 
to appoint a prime minister who has the support of that majority”2.
On this note, a Prime-Minister is usually nominated by the President and then 
requires the vote of confidence of a parliamentary majority in many cases of semi-
presidential constitutional frameworks. And, in some cases, there is the possibility 
that the parliamentary majority may not be the same as the party/coalition supporting 
the President and consequently, may not agree with the President’s nominated Prime-
Minister and only grant the vote of confidence to their preferred candidate. Therefore, 
the French case – albeit exemplary, is not singular.
As such, it appears that cohabitation is rather a phenomenon specific to semi-
presidential regimes, as it implies that ”there is a President from one party and a 
prime minister from an opposing party [and also that] the President’s party is not 
represented in the cabinet”3. Needless to say, such a representation would inevitably 
lead to intra-branch conflict between the dualist executive structure, as numerous 
accounts throughout European semi-presidential regimes have proven4. 
1 Robert ELGIE, Divided Government…cit., p. 106.
2 Ibidem.
3 Robert ELGIE, Iain MCMENAMIN, ”Explaining the Onset of Cohabitation Under Semi-
Presidentialism”, Political Studies, vol. 58, no. 3, 2011, pp. 616-635/p. 616.
4 For further reference, see Oleh PROTSYK, ”Intra-Executive Competition Between Presi-
dent and Prime-Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation Under Semi-Presi-
dentialism”, Political Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2006, pp. 219-224.
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Theories on Cohabitation and Semi-Presidentialism
When analyzing the concept of cohabitation, it appears that a proper definition 
of semi-presidentialism is required, particularly in light of a coherent and thorough 
analysis of the consequences this phenomenon is likely to produce. On this note, the 
three criteria advanced by Maurice Duverger’s definition are crucial: a) the President 
of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; b) the President’s powers are quite 
considerable; c) the Prime-Minister and his/her cabinet of ministers possess executive 
and governmental powers and require the vote of confidence of the legislature in 
order to remain in office1. Nevertheless, from the perspective of political science, it 
has been argued that the second criteria is the most difficult to measure and the most 
subjective and therefore, prone to inaccuracies and interpretations. 
From this perspective, Matthew Shugart and John Carey2 further developed on 
Duverger’s definition and distinguished between president-parliamentary systems – in 
which a) the President is elected by a popular vote for a fixed term in office; b) the 
President appoints and dismisses the Prime-Minister and other cabinet ministers; c) 
the Prime-Minister and the cabinet ministers are subjected to both parliamentary and 
presidential vote of confidence; d) the President typically has some legislative powers 
and the power to dissolve the Parliament – and premier-presidential systems in which 
a) the President is elected by a popular vote for a fixed term in office; b) the President 
has considerable constitutional authority; c) the Prime-Minister and his/her cabinet 
are subjected to the vote of confidence of the Parliament.
Unlike Duverger’s definition, the latter explanation of semi-presidentialism 
is easier to apply after a study of the constitutional framework that establishes the 
structure and the respective functions of each public authority. In the Romanian case, 
Shugart and Carey’s classification applies in the form of premier-presidentialism 
and not in that of president-parliamentarism, as the President cannot dismiss the 
government, for much as he would be tempted to, because the Prime-Minister and 
his cabinet are not subjected to the President’s vote of confidence.
An interesting study that correlates cohabitation with semi-presidentialism across 
European electoral democracies is that of Robert Elgie and Iain McMenamin. Starting 
from the assumption that ”cohabitation is more likely to occur in countries with a 
premier-presidential form of semi-presidentialism”3, the authors identify several 
factors which may lead to the emergence of cohabitation, such as: 1) the absence of 
a majority for the President’s party in the legislature; 2) after an electoral cycle, but 
usually not when the elections for President and legislature are synchronized; and 
3) in the aftermath of a legislative election.
1 Maurice DUVERGER, ”A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government”, 
European Journal of Political Research, no. 8, 1980, pp. 165-187/p. 172.
2 For further references, see Matthew Soberg SHUGART, John CAREY, ”The Electoral 
Cycle...cit.”.
3 Robert ELGIE, Iain McMENAMIN, ”Explaining the Onset of Cohabitation Under Semi-
Presidentialism”, in Political Studies, vol. 58, no. 3, 2011, pp. 616-635/p. 616.
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THE PECULIARITY OF THE ROMANIAN 
POST-COMMUNIST CASES OF COHABITATION
Taking into account their causal model, the Romanian case appears as an exception. 
To begin with, because cohabitation first occurred under President Traian Băsescu 
and Prime-Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu in 2007, so it was not a result of the 
elections which had taken place in 2004. Moreover, the presidential and parliamentary 
elections were synchronized, contrary to their hypothesis and findings. And finally, it 
was not the result of a legislative election that generated cohabitation during the last 
year of Tăriceanu’s mandate, but more rather the political context and the conflictual 
relations that had been constantly deteriorating between the two heads of public 
authorities. The most recent example of cohabitation also emerges as a deviation 
from their model, because once again, it is not the result of elections, even if this time 
they were not synchronized. Quite interestingly, the second period of cohabitation 
under post-communist Romania is taking place under the same President, although it 
involves a prime minister from a different party. 
On the other hand, it is also interesting to note that both the National Liberal Party 
and the Social Democratic Party were first part of the governing coalition with the 
President’s party – the Democrat-Liberal Party – and initially had several ministerial 
portfolios prior to the cohabitation period. Then, in 2007-2008, Prime-Minister Călin 
Popescu Tăriceanu reshuffled his Cabinet so that it no longer contained any members 
of the Democrat-Liberal Party, and in 2012, Prime-Minister Victor Ponta reformed his 
Cabinet so as to exclude members of the Democrat-Liberals. As a result, in a premier-
presidential regime, President Traian Băsescu is forced to nominate a Prime-Minister 
from a different party, who nevertheless enjoys the support of a parliamentary majority 
and who appoints a Cabinet that further excludes the Democrat-Liberal party from 
the Government.
Another circumstance expressly identified by Elgie and McMenamin is that in 
which ”cohabitation […] occurs if the incumbent government was voted down by the 
legislature and a new government was formed that excluded the President’s party”1. 
Yet, the authors also maintain that this type of cohabitation is unlikely to be produced, 
as in semi-presidential systems it is still the President who designates the chosen 
Prime-Minister – a constitutional prerogative which consequently enables him/her 
to nominate a Prime-Minister to his liking, preferably from within his own support 
party – and, should this possibility fail due to the legislature’s refusal to invest the 
designated Government with their vote of confidence since it does not represent the 
parliamentary majority, the President still has the option of dissolving the Parliament 
(according to article 89, paragraph 1 of the Fundamental Law)2 instead of accepting a 
Prime-Minister of another political affiliation. 
On this basis, the authors conclude that ”the President would still be able to 
avoid cohabitation”3. Once again, the Romanian case stands as an exception, because 
1 Ibidem, p. 624.
2 ”After consultations with presidents of both Chambers and the leaders of the Parliamentary 
groups, the President of Romania may dissolve the Parliament, if no vote of confidence has 
been obtained to form a Government within 60 days after the first request was made, and only 
after rejection of at least two requests for investiture”. 
3 Robert ELGIE, Iain McMENAMIN, ”Explaining the Onset of Cohabitation…cit.”, p. 624.
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the Romanian President Traian Băsescu did not manage to avoid cohabitation, even 
though it occurred outside the electoral cycle. Since he does not have the constitutional 
attributes to dismiss the Prime-Minister, he was forced to cohabitate with Prime-
Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu in 2007-2008 after the Cabinet reshuffle that excluded 
ministers from the Democrat-Liberal Party, so he could not really do anything about 
it. However, in 2009, when the first Cabinet of Emil Boc was voted down by the 
Parliament following a censorship motion, he did try to avoid cohabitation. Against 
the wishes of a majoritarian opposition, he refused to designate Klaus Johannis as 
Prime-Minister and instead nominated Lucian Croitoru (an independent) – who failed 
to receive the Parliament’s vote of confidence – and then Liviu Negoiţă (member of 
the Democratic Liberal Party) who was not going to attain the vote of confidence, 
either. However, President Traian Băsescu did not dissolve the Parliament but, after 
the 2009 presidential elections, managed to impose his preferred Prime-Minister, Emil 
Boc, for a second time. His strategy changed in May 2012, after the Mihai Răzvan 
Ungureanu Government was voted down through a censorship motion by the two 
Chambers, when Traian Băsescu did have the option of designating a new Prime-
Minister from within his support party again. But he did not and, instead, appointed 
the leader of the opposition, Victor Ponta. 
Moreover, the issue of legitimacy could easily be invoked in such circumstances. 
Specific to any semi-presidential regime, the President is elected directly by the people, 
thereby his legitimacy originates from the people, as does that of the Parliament, in 
which both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate are elected by the people. On the 
other hand, the Government does not have the same source of legitimacy. According 
to article 103, paragraph 1 of the Fundamental Law ”the President of Romania shall 
designate a candidate to the office of prime minister, as a result of his consultations 
with the party which has obtained absolute majority in the Parliament or – unless 
such majority exists – with the parties represented in Parliament”. Even if it could 
be argued that, by receiving the vote of confidence from the Parliament, as the most 
representative authority, the Government is therefore legitimated by the people, albeit 
indirectly, it would still remain that it does not have the same legitimacy as the other 
two organs.
Thus, the potential for conflictual relations within the dual structure of the 
executive is high. And it has been exploited to its fullest in the Romanian case, by any 
means provided by the Constitution and the mass-media. Of course, the conflictual 
outcome of cohabitation is not specific to the Romanian political framework and 
various forms of divided government have generally lead to conflictual relations 
between the heads of public authorities which often a times produced gridlock in 
the United States, Finland, Poland, etc. Nevertheless, unlike the Polish model of 
cohabitation, the frequency with which the Romanian heads of public authorities 
have found it necessary to involve the authority of the Romanian Constitutional 
Court under the pretence of institutional blockages is alarming.
On this note, Cristian Preda claimed that ”in Romania, post-communism does 
not articulate itself on cleavages and not even on lasting political tensions”1. It is a 
statement that portrays our political system as instable and lacking in consistency 
and coherence. Political alliances are made without any ideological consensus, 
1 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic din România, Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2008, p. 159.
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coalitions are useful only in so far as they turn out to be successful in the elections, 
a minority party is willing to become a member of any governing coalition as long 
as it’s majoritarian in the Parliament and represented in the Government, while the 
opposition seems unable to mobilize its members effectively so as to succeed in its 
endeavours. Overall, political conflict becomes insignificant and easily forgotten. 
Against such a background, it may come as no surprise that many of the theories 
previously presented on divided government and on the successful models of 
cohabitation do not apply correspondingly. Instead, Romania is recognized as the 
exception which, supposedly, confirms the theory on cohabitation.
The Romanian democratic experience does not allow for such an extensive 
evaluation of the presidential and legislative elections as would, for instance, be 
provided by the French case. Instead, its experience is comparable with that of Poland 
and the contrast is highly visible: two countries with a similar communist background 
entail completely different versions of government, in which unified government is 
the norm in Romania and cohabitation as a form of divided government is specific 
to the Polish political arena. On this, while in Romania cohabitation is a quite recent 
phenomenon experienced only once up to the 2008 legislative elections (2007-2008) 
Poland had a recurrent history of divided government (1991-1993; 1993-1995; 1997-
2000; 2000-2001; 2007-2009)1.
One of the first and most obvious contributing factors to this perpetual unified 
governance we have experienced may be that the presidential and parliamentary 
elections have been held simultaneously in Romania until 2004, which meant that 
the first ballot of the presidential elections was held the same day as the elections 
for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Quoting Robert Elgie and Iain 
McMenamin’s study on the onset of cohabitation under semi-presidentialism, in 
which they found that ”cohabitation will not occur when presidential and legislative 
elections are synchronized”2 this appears as a possible explanation. Although, it 
should be noted that following the 2003 revision of the Romanian Fundamental Law 
when the President’s mandate was increased from 4 years to 5 years precisely so as 
to avoid this synchronization, the 2008/2009 legislative and presidential elections 
produced the same outcome as those that preceded them: unified government.
Then again, electoral synchronization is not the only plausible explanation. 
Another factor resides in the results of the elections themselves, as with the exception 
of the first post-communist electoral cycle when the National Salvation Front managed 
to attain a clear and comfortable majority in the 1990 and 1992 legislative elections, all 
of the other majorities were based on coalitions: the Red Quadrilateral (FDSN/PDSR; 
PUNR; PRM; PSM) in 1992-1996, the Democratic Convention (PNŢCD; PNL; PNL-
CD; PAR; PER; FER) with the Social Democrat Union (PSDR and PD) and UDMR in 
1996-2000; the Social Democratic Party3 and PUR (until 2003) during Adrian Năstase’s 
Cabinet in 2000-2004; the ”Truth and Justice” Alliance (PNL and PD) with UDMR and 
PUR/PC from 2004 to 2007 and finally the Democratic Liberal Party and the Social 
Democratic Party from 2008 until December 2009, followed by another governing 
coalition formed by the Democratic Liberal Party, UDMR and UNPR. I have 
1 A comparative chart of examples of cohabitation across Europe in 1989-2008 can be found 
in Robert ELGIE, Iain McMENAMIN, ”Explaining the Onset of Cohabitation…cit. ”, p. 622.
2 Ibidem.
3 Prior to 2001 known as PDSR and PSDR.
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deliberately excluded the second Cabinet of Călin Popescu Tăriceanu in 2007-2008, 
supported by the National Liberal Party and UDMR, as it is a period of cohabitation. 
Until the Cabinet reshuffle of 2007, the President’s party was represented in the 
Government and at the same time was always part of the majority coalition in the 
Parliament. Consequently and given Quirk’s definition which I have previously cited, 
it is clear that from 1990 until 2007 Romania has only experienced unified government, 
even if not in the pure form of one-party-unified-government, as would be specific to 
the American two-party system. In fact, of all the six elections organized in the post-
communist aftermath, only the 1990 and 1992 elections were won by a party and not 
by a coalition or an electoral alliance1.
Still, aside from the immediate objective of winning the elections, ”the ideological 
orientation of a governing coalition in parliament is the most immediate factor that 
shapes the intra-executive coexistence”2. For that reason, in spite of enjoying the 
blessings of unified government, the coalitions/the alliances were most of the times 
formed by completely different political parties, with their own agenda and view on 
the governing program and process. As such, most of the intra-executive relations 
were tense, especially those between the President Ion Iliescu and Prime-Minister 
Petre Roman (1990-1991) and those between President Emil Constantinescu and 
Prime-Minister Radu Vasile, even though on both accounts the heads of the executive 
shared the same political affiliation. Yet, a fine distinction is in order: in the former, 
Iliescu and Roman were actually leaders of two opposing factions within the National 
Salvation Front, and in the latter case, the Romanian Democratic Convention was 
merely an umbrella political device that comprised different political parties, with the 
sole objective of winning the elections even if they were, to a certain extent, different 
in ideology and program. 
Another example in point is that of the incumbent President Traian Băsescu and 
former Prime-Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu. Winners of the 2004 simultaneously 
held legislative and presidential elections and both members of the ”Truth and Justice” 
Alliance that was comprised of the National Liberal Party and the Democrat Party, 
they almost immediately disagreed on various issues and confronted each other on 
numerous occasions at the Romanian Constitutional Court and especially in the mass-
media. In fact, the perpetual conflict engaged them both to such an extent that in 2007, 
Prime-minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu decided to reshuffle his Cabinet so that it 
no longer contained any members of the Democrat Party/Democrat-Liberal Party, 
entered into a different majority coalition that would support him in the Parliament, 
also by excluding the Democrat Party from it and consequently inaugurate the first 
period of divided government in the Romanian post-communist experience, from 
2007-2008, when new legislative elections were held.
Moreover, during the second mandate of President Traian Băsescu, the first 
Cabinet of Emil Boc was formed of a coalition that brought together the Democrat-
Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party. However, this coalition was only 
short-lived, as in 2009, following the office removal of Dan Nica – Minister of 
Administration and Interior and member of the Social Democratic Party – all of the 
1 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele…cit., p. 85.
2 Oleh PROTSYK, ”Intra-Executive Competition Between President and Prime-Minister: 
Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation Under Semi-Presidentialism”, Political 
Studies, vol. 54, no. 2, 2006, pp. 219-224/p. 223.
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Social Democratic ministers (Ilie Sârbu, Ecaterina Andronescu, Cristian Diaconescu, 
Victor Ponta, Ionuţ Bazac, Nicolae Nemirschi, Marian Sârbu and Constantin Niţă) 
resigned in solidarity with their colleague and as a form of protest to the Democratic 
Liberals’ measure. The Cabinet reshuffle did not receive the vote of confidence of the 
Parliament. Then, in spite of the majority’s plea for Klaus Johannis, Mayor of Sibiu, as 
the new Prime-Minister, the acting President Traian Băsescu still designated a Prime-
Minister of his own choice: Lucian Croitoru, a supposedly independent candidate 
who, nevertheless, included Democratic Liberal ministers in his Cabinet proposal and 
Liviu Negoiţă, a member of the Democratic Liberal Party, who was also the Mayor of 
District 3 in Bucharest and who designated even more Democratic Liberal ministers 
in his Cabinet formula. Eventually, after the 2009 presidential elections and with a 
newly-forged parliamentary majority, this time, President Traian Băsescu designated 
the same Prime-Minister that was removed from office due to the first censorship 
motion admitted in the post-communist history and who, given these circumstances, 
finally received the legislature’s vote of confidence. 
Therefore, in light of these experiences, I would agree with Oleh Protsyk’s 
statement according to which ”the fact that the President and the Prime-Minister 
belong to the same majority coalition does not serve as a sufficient condition for 
avoiding intra-executive confrontation”1. In fact, if the coalition or the alliance is 
comprised of ideologically opposing parties, frictions are certain to arise, even within 
the same Government, as the 2008-2009 Boc Cabinet example has proven. On the 
same note, if a political party is highly fragmented, intra-executive confrontation is 
still likely to occur, even if the acting President and Prime-Ministers are members of 
the same party, as the Ion Iliescu – Petre Roman (1990-1991) instance illustrated. 
Finally, the form of unified government experienced in the Romanian case 
remains subjected to debate. It seems to still be prone to conflictual relations which are 
typically specific to forms of divided government. Perhaps that is because it is nothing 
more than an artificial construct, devised for the sole immediate purpose of winning 
the elections and lacking a coherent plan about the aftermath of the electoral cycle. 
Or maybe simply because the Romanian political landscape is not quite articulated 
from an ideological point of view to such an extent, that it lacks consistency even in 
its political tensions, as Cristian Preda suggested. Either way, although unified from 
an arithmetical point of view, a strong case could be made here for the existence of 
divided government from a behavioural perspective.
CONSEQUENCES
Many of the scholars on divided government have argued that its consequences 
are negative and that it is very likely to produce gridlock and stalemate. Obviously, 
the ideological differences and the contrasting programmes and agendas are probably 
going to determine conflictual relations which will make it difficult for any of them 
to advance their own vision. It will be difficult for a Democratic Congress to advance 
their own policy against a Republican President who may veto their legislation, for 
instance.
1 Ibidem, p. 224.
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On the same note, in semi-presidential regimes, where the President does not 
have the right to veto any legislation, he/she is entitled, nevertheless, to either return 
the law to the Parliament for reconsideration and/or submit it to the Constitutional 
Court to confirm its validity1. Hence, even in semi-presidential regimes, the possibility 
of gridlock and stalemate still exists as a consequence of divided government. In the 
Romanian case, for instance, the Constitutional Court has been called by the President 
to rule on the a priori constitutionality of laws only twice from 1991 until 2004. Then, 
during President Traian Băsescu’s two consecutive mandates, this measure has been 
employed 22 times until now, 8 times of which only during the cohabitation period 
of 2007-20082.
Moreover, Cox and Kernell argue that ”partisan differences magnify the institu-
tional separation of powers”3. The same political adherence usually determines a 
certain degree of institutional coordination during times of unified government, as 
the President is prone to designate a Prime-Minister from within his political faction 
who, in turn, will form a Cabinet with ministers from his party/coalition/alliance 
which will, finally, receive the vote of confidence from the supporting parliamentary 
political formation which is, most of the times, the same. The constitutional design for 
separation of powers is fundamental not only for ensuring that each public authority 
has its own set of attributions and functions only in so far as those attributions 
specifically provide for, but it also calls for the need for cooperation. However, during 
times of divided government, when the political affiliations of the heads of the public 
authorities differs, they are less likely to cooperate and therefore, it could be argued 
that the institutional separation of powers becomes exaggerated. 
On a contrasting note, a thorough study of the American legislative process comes 
to a different conclusion. In his Divided We Govern4 Mayhew contends that divided 
government does not, in fact, have any relevant consequence on the legislative process 
or policy and that it does not produce gridlock, contrary to popular belief. His study 
is, however, restrained to the American context, specific to presidential regimes in 
which the President holds the veto power and is difficult to apply to other cases.
Finally, Cox and Kernell5 argue that decision-makers can choose their strategy 
during periods of divided government so as to meet their goals. They identify three 
such options: a) to go it alone – meaning that each political player decides to pursue 
his/her own agenda, ”without cooperating with others, and makes extensive usage 
of the legal and constitutional arguments” they find in support of their game; b) to go 
public – leaders make ”public commitments to particular positions in order to raise 
the cost of reneging and thereby strengthen one’s bargaining position” while at the 
same time rendering public opinion as arbiter between them; and finally c) to bargain 
with the beltway – implying ”delay and brinkmanship, careful attention to revision 
points, and the selling out of junior partners”6. Each of these strategies has, of course, 
1 Art 77 of the Fundamental Law, paragraphs (2) and (3).
2 Source: the Activity Report of the Romanian Constitutional Court, available at http://
www.ccr.ro/statistics/pdf/ro/activ07_12.pdf, accesed on July, 31st 2012.
3 Gary COX, Samuel KERNELL (eds), The Politics of Divided Government, Westview Press, 
Boulder Colorado, 1991, p. 152.
4 David MAYHEW, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-
1990, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991, p. 180.
5 Gary COX, Samuel KERNELL (eds), The Politics...cit., p. 243.
6 Ibidem.
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its disadvantages: the first one is destined to provoke institutional conflicts and even 
blockages, the second one is also quite likely to generate conflictual relations and 
alter the public perception about the authority of the executive and/or legislative 
and finally, the third strategy has the potential of determining the authority being 
bargained with the beltway to take matters into its own hands and even attempt to 
exceed its constitutional prerogatives.
In this view, the Romanian case provides examples for all of these strategies 
during just two years of cohabitation: both the President Traian Băsescu and the 
Prime-Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu decided to ”go it alone” which ultimately 
culminated in a series of cases of juridical conflicts of a constitutional nature brought 
before the Romanian Constitutional Court; both of them became engaged in slanderous 
accusations against each other (and even against other political parties and authorities) 
across the mass-media – which also resulted in cases brought to the Constitutional 
Court and, last but not least, they both bargained with the beltway, exemplary being 
the President’s refusal to designate a new Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2007, which 
also resulted in a juridical conflict of a constitutional nature, acknowledged as such by 
the Court in its Decision no. 356/5.04.2007 which was published in the Official Gazette 
no. 322/14.05.2007.
CONCLUSIONS
In the end, it appears that the Romanian experience of divided government should 
be interpreted from both the arithmetical and the behavioural perspective. Otherwise, 
it would be difficult to understand how, even during periods of unified government, 
conflictual relations still arise and sometimes, in a highly aggressive manner – as was 
the case of former President Emil Constantinescu and Prime-Minister Radu Vasile. 
In addition, I would also have to agree with Guys Peters’s statement that the 
concept of coalition governments is the European version of divided government, 
given our post-communist history. Coalitions/political alliances are lacking in 
coherence of their agenda and their leaders consequently engage in confrontational 
relations shortly after winning the election. In fact, it could also be argued that 
coalitions which put together political parties of significantly different ideologies are 
likely to eventually produce cohabitation, as was the case of the ”Truth and Justice” 
Alliance. 
On the other hand, I believe that an active and aggressive opposition is also 
instrumental in elevating the conflictual relations, regardless of the form of government 
(unified or divided). In our case, the Social Democratic Party immediately took 
advantage of the political context created by Tăriceanu’s Cabinet reshuffle in 2007 
and orchestrated the first Presidential suspension proceeding, as well as the second 
suspension. Also, throughout the entire period they have been in the opposition, the 
Social Democrats have been aggressively trying to bring down the Government by 
initiating numerous censorship motions and they have been ”going to the public” in 
attempt to win the public opinion on their side.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the Parliamentary majority is not relevant 
in the cases of juridical conflicts of a constitutional nature. That is because there is not 
a prerequisite number of deputies/senators who need to adhere to a notification of the 
Constitutional Court. Instead, it is only the President of the Chamber of Deputies and 
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the President of the Senate respectively who are entitled to do so, as representatives 
of the Chambers they lead. In addition, these two heads of public authorities do not 
necessarily need to take similar stances in such cases. As I have previously mentioned, 
such conflicts tend to appear more frequently between opposing political affiliations 
in power, whereas different branches of power with similar political affiliations tend 
to ally in political conflicts – an example in point being the recent stance taken by the 
Chamber of Deputies, which is headed by the Democratic Liberal Roberta Anastase 
and which never sides with the Senate in these constitutional conflicts, but with the 
President or with the Government with which it shares the same political affiliation. 
